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Abstract 
The article is built around the analysis of The critique of instrumental reason by 
Horkheimer, applied to issues connected with the philosophy of economics. Positive 
economics is under-stood as an example of a discipline where the pragmatic para-
digm has been implemented. Therefore, economics functions within the boundaries 
of what Horkheimer called instrumental rationality. The starting point is the intel-
lectual source shared by economics and the Frankfurt School, namely Kant’s phi-
losophy of rationality. In the first part of the article, three of Kant’s ideas that are 
fundamental to economics are presented, and then the development of their appli-
cation in philosophy of science, as seen by Horkheimer in 1947, is laid out. The 
second part of the article consists of enumerating various distinctive features of eco-
nomics that set it apart from other social sciences and which constitute factors for 
which it can be considered a realm of the reign of ‘instrumental rationality’, with 
all the threats such an approach provokes. The above-mentioned features concen-
trate on treating humans in economics as a means, not as a goal. This aspect of the 
philosophy of science of the Frankfurt School (unlike its critique of capitalism as 
an economic system) has not been widely received. 
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1. Preliminary remarks 
In the article, culture is understood as the universe of human activity that is typical 
only of humans: it encompasses everyday life practices, legal and political systems, 
economic relations and everything else that may have no connection to the narrowly 
understood idea of culture as a creative/artistic activity. The term economics many 
times will appear as an abbreviation for positive economics (engaged by every 
school of economics) and also for such examples of normative economics, in which 
the relation between human beings and the economy is the same as in positive eco-
nomics. Although the present article refers only to the Critique of Instrumental Rea-
son by M. Horkheimer, there will be a few places where the surname of its author 
will be exchanged with the term ‘the Frankfurt School’, created by Horkheimer to-
gether with T. Adorno, because Horkheimer’s text is a cohesive completion of the 
ideas that he expressed together with Adorno. 
2. Introduction 
On what basis can an analysis of cultivating positive economics be made from the 
perspective of critical philosophy? In their critique, the Frankfurt School authors 
referred (1) directly to the ideas introduced by Kant, generally accepting them (how-
ever with certain modifications) and (2) to the heritage of the Enlightenment, in-
cluding especially the heritage of Kant’s philosophy that was used by positive phi-
losophy and later, pragmatism. At the same time, basic concepts of economics as 
a scientific discipline also come from the very same source: the philosophy of Kant, 
and its transformed, positive and pragmatic versions. 
Moreover, looking at modern-day economics through the Frankfurt School 
lens seems even more interesting given the fact that its critique was aimed explicitly 
mostly against the phenomenon of the economisation of the human cultural envi-
ronment,1 therefore its concepts deal with the economic practices of capitalism, 
which is partially supported by the theory of economics. 
What is symptomatic of the chasm between economics and philosophy is that 
(1) this question did not meet with much interest among economic theorists2 and (2) 
nor did Horkheimer himself notice the direct relationship between the intensely 
pragmatic, imperialistic philosophy of economics and the all-devouring economi-
sation of social life, although he described pragmatism that pervades the philosophy 
of science in theory and the pragmatisation (economisation) of culture in social 
                                                          
1 M. Horkheimer, T. Adorno, Dialektyka Oświecenia. Fragmenty filozoficzne, Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, 
Warsaw 1994. 
2 The very issue presented in the article has been partially analysed in the essay by H. Stewart, A critique 
of instrumental reason in economics, “Economics and Philosophy” 1995, Vol. 11, pp. 57–83.  
Usually, texts on economics written in the paradigm of critical theory are concentrated on the 
normative aspects of the economy and management (which means they critique capitalism as an eco-
nomic system). They do not focus on the philosophical ground of rationality in economics. 
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practice. Horkheimer’s critique was addressed precisely to pragmatic philosophers. 
As a ‘professional’ philosopher, Horkheimer forewent the possibility of talking 
about particular disciplines of science and their domains, stating that ‘economic and 
social aspects of modernity are the object of studies of competent scientists.’3 
The fact that his philosophical, general and non-pragmatic thought can be ap-
plied 70 years later to the analysis of a specific field of economic science is one of 
many proofs of the intellectual superiority of philosophy.  
3. Kant and economics 
A. Smith is considered the father of the theory of economics. In 1759, for the first 
time, he mentioned ‘the invisible hand’, a mechanism thanks to which the sum of 
particular egoistic, antagonistic interests of individuals brings the maximisation of 
happiness to society as a whole. Although it lacked logical explanation and the 
‘hand’ seemed supernatural, it was accepted as the cornerstone of economics. It 
proves to be highly useful as it frees the individual from responsibility towards oth-
ers for undertaking egoistic decisions. Had economics appreciated a more abstract, 
generally important philosophy, Kant could be well introduced as its real father. 
Kant (1) explained the invisible hand mechanism in a rational way, (2) re-defined 
the idea of progress, which is central to economics and (3) defined its ontological 
field of interest in the frames of what he called practical reason. 
Kant did not believe in the possibility of moral transformation and progress of 
an individual in the history of mankind, because man was scared with an inherent, 
a-historic, ‘radical’ evil, which manifests itself through his egoism. But, at the same 
time, he claimed that the progress of mankind is possible and it can be manifested 
in the legal and political structures of the society. History indeed presented the 
emancipation of mankind from barbarism to civilisation, from despotism to repub-
lics. Individual people do compete with each other for resources, but they have 
a reason, and thanks to this reason they learn that they can also cooperate (through 
the so-called ‘asocial sociability’). The egoistic and ‘reasonable’ elements collide 
constantly and this dynamic process brings the gradual improvement of social mo-
rale, meaning: an increase in the domination of ‘civilised’ (‘reasonable’) elements 
over ‘natural’ (‘egoistic’) ones. In this way, thanks to reason, a human is not able to 
completely eradicate the beast inside him, but he learns how to effectively tame it. 
Kant treated this ‘reason’ as the most effective organ that substitutes claws and tusks 
in humans and enables them to survive in nature. Thanks to reason – wit, intelli-
gence, the ability to forecast and calculate – people managed to become something 
that is above nature.4 
Progress is a never-ending process and not a state. It never stops, it has no 
definite purpose. ‘Enlightenment’, which is a synonym for progress, has no other 
reason than dynamic endurance. Kant was anti-utopian in the sense that he did not 
                                                          
3 M. Horkheimer, Krytyka instrumentalnego rozumu, Scholar, Warsaw 2007, p. 35 (translated by J.K.). 
4 Z. Kuderowicz, Czy Kant wierzył w postęp? [in:] Kant wobec problemów współczesnego świata, eds. 
J. Miklaszewska, P. Spryszak, Jagiellonian University Press, Cracow 2006, pp. 13–17. 
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believe that mankind will ever achieve, once and forever, a state of optimal condi-
tions; he did not try to delineate such conditions of ‘the fulfilment of progress’ and 
he was convicted that no one should ever impose his finalist model of general hap-
piness onto individuals.5 A direct analogy to how economists treat economic growth 
can be clearly seen. In all the economic models and recommendations, economists 
never tend to indicate the possibility of achieving the final end of ongoing efforts, 
work, renunciations or postponing pleasures for ‘later’.6 
4. Kant and Horkheimer 
The type of rationality described above, used to obtain the effect of ‘the invisible 
hand’ and collective progress, Kant called ‘practical reason’. Practical reason means 
the human ability to efficiently function in public life. It is a kind of an instrument. 
This type of rationality determined most important concepts of economic mecha-
nisms and many economic ideas. However, apart from practical reason, above it 
Kant placed a different feature that all people are equipped with – theoretical reason. 
The latter enabled people to acquire scientific knowledge, contemplate, discover the 
secrets of the world and make contact with the absolute. 150 years after Kant, Hork-
heimer noted that the way in which Kant’s system of two rationalities was applied 
in the thought of 19th and 20th century philosophical movements was aberrated and 
was characterised by favouring practical reason. First, domination of practical ra-
tionality took the form of positivism, which saw as scientific facts only those phe-
nomena that could be proven in the way of empirical experiments or presented with 
the use of mathematics (and which renounced all those phenomena which could not 
be proved in such a way). Later, it became more radical with the advance of prag-
matism, which not only demoted any non-sensual cognition, but which scornfully 
rejected any need for pure thinking, abstraction and speculation that would not serve 
particular interests, but was instead autotelic. As Horkheimer saw it, pragmatism 
was an anti-philosophy, an ‘anti-intellectual Darwinism’ that undermines funda-
ments of rationality as understood by Kant (as Kant included both types of ration-
ality, theoretical reason being autotelic). Pragmatism is directed towards pure utility 
because it negates the very existence of theoretical reason as a ‘reason’. Pragmatism 
does not seek to find the ‘meaning’; moreover, it treats as ‘meaningless’ everything 
that deals with ‘meaning’. And as the nature of human beings is directed at making 
the world meaningful, pragmatism is anti-humanistic. 
Horkheimer created a pair of opposing types of reason in analogy to Kant’s 
dichotomy of practical/theoretical. He described two types of rationalities: objective 
and subjective/instrumental. They are both integral and nonerasable components of 
                                                          
5 J. Miklaszewska, Kantowska utopia racjonalności [in:] Kant wobec problemów…, op. cit., pp. 75–86. 
6 Compare: J.M. Keynes, Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren [in] Essays in Persuasion, Mac-
millan London 1931, pp. 358–374. 
From today’s economics perspective this text can be considered a proper utopia, as Keynes, a hu-
man-oriented economist, supposed in it that by the 21st century people would not have to work any longer 
as an effect of having obtained a sufficient techno-economic level of development. 
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rationality. Throughout the history of mankind they have competed for domination 
and they both have imperialistic tendencies. Objective rationality reigned until the 
Enlightenment. Objective rationality is a substantial, all-encompassing being of 
metaphysical nature, a universal order, and man tries to find his place in this order, 
to tune in into the harmony of the universe. The human being – as an element of the 
universe – is also equipped with objective rationality. When he uses it, it means he 
is alert to read how rationality is manifested in the world and to adjust his behaviour 
to what this rationality requires of him. The aim, and also the synonym of objective 
rationality, are all the highest values, like: truth, good, freedom and justice.7 
When put into historical context, philosophical structures based on such ration-
ality were embedded in religious systems, in which the final source of all the above-
mentioned values was God. During the Enlightenment, philosophy rejected socially 
oppressive religious systems and focused solely on the human being – on his dignity 
and his inherent freedom. Human beings were granted these qualities because they 
were endowed with reason, with rationality (which made them conscious and dis-
tinguished them from animals). Human reason – a guarantee of their dignity – was 
not referenced to any external instance. In this way, Enlightenment brought the idea 
of rationality to subject (person) - therefore rationality became subjectified. Subjec-
tive reasoning is an attribute, a disposition of a man. It rejects granting rational 
foundations to any general ideas (like values). It does not seek aims; it even negates 
the sense of having any aims or values. It is only interested in how to properly 
choose the most suitable means for a given aim. The domain of subjective rational-
ity lies within classification, deduction and calculation. Just as Kant’s theoretical 
reason that was directed at discovering truth was an emanation of objective ration-
ality (theoretical reason strives to find the truth because it believes that truth exists 
in the world), practical reason, treated as an instrument of evolution (it is what sep-
arates humans from other animals) is how subjective rationality is manifested. 
The paradox of the domination of subjective rationality lies within its tendency 
to completely eliminate objective rationality (as ‘unjustified’ on the grounds of sub-
jective rationality), as it exists in the world of humans, and the structure of this 
world involves the existence of both means as well as aims. The moment in which 
rationality limits itself to the sphere of organising means, it leaves the sphere of 
setting aims completely out of the competence of any rationality at all, which means 
it gives up the aims of human life as an easy prey for irrationality – all that Kant 
called ‘nature’ (identified with egoism), the opposition of practical reason. Ration-
ality ‘abdicated (…) from evaluating human deeds and human way of living. It left 
this task to antagonised particular interests, and our world seems to be truly their 
prey.’8 In effect of this: ‘spiritual imperialism of the abstract rule of self-interest 
[leads to the situation where] no functional, rational rule of social cohesion was 
saved (…), all the substance of rationality was arbitrarily reduced to only one of its 
components, it was closed in the frames of only one of its rules; what was particular 
took over the place of what was general.’9 
                                                          
7 M. Horkheimer, op. cit., p. 38. 
8 Ibidem, p. 42. 
9 Ibidem, pp. 50–51. 
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In times before the Enlightenment, religion, as a medium of spiritual objectiv-
ity, would integrate scientific cognition within it (the most prominent example of 
such a structure being Thomism). In the aftermath of the Enlightenment (in the time 
of the reign of positivism), religion was not eliminated from the world, but religious-
moral order – still responsible for establishing the aims of human life – was com-
pletely separated from scientific order, which defined itself as rational (subjectively 
rational) and was preoccupied with elaborating suitable means. Technocracy be-
came the philosophy of science. As this technocracy progressed, it took the form of 
pragmatism, claiming that choosing the right means was science’s final and only 
reason for being, and science’s ‘vocation’ was to be consistent, stable and in con-
stant movement (the terms in economics used to describe desired economic growth). 
Rationality, understood only as a means for adaptation that enables the individual 
to survive, capitulates in front of the strive to change anything in the world. The 
only thing a ‘reasonable’ individual can do is to accept the ‘irrational’ world as it is 
and to adapt to it by ‘divesting oneself of stubbornness’.10 In such conditions, even 
social moral progress as Kant saw it is impossible. From the point of view of instru-
mental reason, cruelty and violence are not evil per se, if they are considered as 
means to something else. On the other hand, no aim – be it happiness or even wealth 
– is valuable enough to be the merit per se, and it cannot be proven that happiness 
or wealth constitute an aim better than any other. Which leads to irrational relativ-
ism: ‘If one would cling consistently to the scientism theory (…) [it should be 
acknowledged that – J.K.] there are no horrible deeds or inhuman relations, and that 
the evil that is seen is merely imagined.’11 
5. Horkheimer and Economics 
Horkheimer conducted a dialectic analysis of the effects of subjective rationality 
domination in philosophy and society for legal-political, psychological and eco-
nomic dimensions of human life. In the political sphere instrumentalisation leads 
from despotism through republicanism to fascism. In the psychological dimension, 
the superficial rationalisation of instincts (human self-interest is treated as rational, 
but only as far as it serves as a tool to civilise the nature external to humans) gives 
rise to an authoritarian personality. 
In economic practice, the turn towards subjectification is represented by the 
transformation from perfect competition to monopolisation. Monopolists do not 
have to rationally negotiate their egoistic aspirations, because these are not met with 
opposition on the side of the ‘masses,’ taught to passively accept reality as it is and 
to adapt to it. While in the perfect competition model actions and reactions can enact 
automatically (‘the invisible hand’), in the later phase of development of capitalism, 
an action manifests unbalanced premeditation and violence.12 Horkheimer under-
mines the belief in the ‘invisible hand’: 
                                                          
10 Ibidem, p. 42. 
11 Ibidem, p. 41. 
12 Ibidem, pp. 157–158  
 ECONOMICS AS A DISCIPLINE OF INSTRUMENTAL REASON… 79 
 
Liberalism with its levelling rule of trade and exchange, which used to bond lib-
eral society, brings conformism as its effect. The monad, the 17th century symbol 
of the atomised individual as an economic subject (…) became a social type. All 
these monads, although separated from each other with the moats of their egoism, 
in their struggle for their own purposes, started to become more and more similar 
to each other. In our day of economic trusts and mass culture, the rule of con-
formism sheds the appearance of individualism, it is proclaimed openly and ele-
vated to the position of a per se ideal.13 
Technocracy and pragmatism work well in technical and natural sciences, be-
cause the object of their endeavours is the material world, but not in social sciences. 
‘Social’ means that their field of study is related to the type of existence that is only 
typical of humans and the distinctive feature of humans is that they are concerned 
with immaterial values. This very characteristic was the reason, why – in the course 
of the enlightened humanistic thought – man was considered the centre of rational-
ity, dignity, freedom and individuality (which are all immaterial values). Man – ac-
cording to the original idea the source of spontaneity and creativity – loses his sub-
jectivity when he treats the act of thinking as a mechanical movement of thoughts 
that does not refer to anything external to itself.14 
6. The effects of instrumetalising reason – positive economics and 
social sciences 
Economics is a social science. However, it is not a humanities discipline. Also, in 
the scope of its research is it very distinctive from all the other social sciences. It 
differs in its methodology based on mathematical models and quantitative calcula-
tions, but, what is more important, it differs in the final reason of its cultivation. The 
level of instrumentalisation of rationality in economics can be noted through its 
comparison with other social disciplines. The aim of sociology is to understand man 
through his functioning in societal structures; the aim of psychology is to understand 
man through his emotional-intellectual construction; the aim of cultural studies is 
to understand man through the civilisation that he creates; and so on; finally, the 
aim of philosophy is to understand man through analysing his essence. Legal and 
political studies also place human beings at the centre of their interests as they de-
liberate over what is just and how to guarantee respecting human dignity. In the 
meantime, the central issue of economics is the economy. What lies at the roots of 
economics scientific consideration is not the attempt to understand man through his 
activity in the field of exchange of goods or management of resources. The aim of 
understanding man is to understand economic activity. Formal economics tends to 
favour such a juxtaposition of people in their social functions that will provide most 
                                                          
13 Ibidem, p. 144. 
14 See: C. Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology, 
Oxford Scholarship Online, Oxford 2009, pp. 25–99. 
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dynamic and most stable economic growth. Whereas one might suspect that there 
is an implicit, final aim to this procedure (which would be associated with human 
happiness), this supposition cannot be justified on the grounds of economics for 
several reasons. 
(1) Most of all, human beings in economics are treated as a resource – ‘human 
resources’ generally do not matter for economic growth any more than capital or 
land/technology. No other scientific discipline ever elaborated a term that would be 
so anti-humanistic. Of course, there are economists who ascribe ‘human resources’ 
with a key-role in the economy, but still it is only a role that people play in their 
goal of achieving economic effectiveness. And if an object is considered a means 
(factor), it is impossible for it to be an end (aim) as well. The canon of economic 
models does not present economic interdependencies, on which human happiness 
relies, but models in which human resources are correlated with another factor in-
fluence the economy in a certain way. The alternative, in the form of e.g. evaluating 
national economies on the basis of the level of happiness of their citizens, is still 
treated by most economists as a para-economic equivalent of ‘alternative medicine’ 
in medicine. 
(2) The second inherence of economics which discredits the belief that any-
thing other than the economy can be its final aim is constituted by the fact that the 
prerequisite rule of economics is the suspension of casting moral judgements on 
individuals’ deeds, which is supposed to assure that it remains always objective. 
This objectivity allows economics to be qualified in the group of positive sciences. 
Differentiating actions of individuals from a moral point of view, according to eco-
nomics, is practically non-viable. Whereas all other social sciences undertake this 
effort (which, in turn, often transforms them into ideologies, as Horkheimer re-
marked), economics prefers to simplify the issue and treat each and every moral 
preference of individuals with the same, null attention, in order to be able, on this 
simplified basis, to construct its abstract models of actions of these unified ‘human 
resources’. Both in theory and in practice, it means that economics allows e.g. the 
mass starvation of people in a global economy where resources are not scarce any 
more (global food production exceeds global demand for food) because all prefer-
ences of all individuals in the world have the same weight. Such a situation can only 
be considered economically unfavourable because it causes a deterioration in ‘hu-
man resources’, which would indicate that such an apprehension of human prefer-
ences is ineffective.15 
(3) Finally, economics still claims to be objective, refusing to accept the ac-
complishments of the post-modern philosophy of science, whose representatives 
noted that no social fact is ever independent of the historical, social, economic and 
                                                          
15 What is paradoxical is that a society which – faced with people starving in large areas of the globe - 
allows for a large portion of its machines to remain unused, does not implement many glorious inventions 
and dedicates uncountable hours of work to the idiotic advertisement and production of annihilation 
weapons – a society that affords such a luxury made productivity its gospel (M. Horkheimer, op. cit., 
p. 147). 
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psychological conditions of the subject which draws his attention to it.16 The selec-
tion of variables included in economic models is not accidental, but implicitly man-
ifests a certain approach of the economists and the variables contain an unspoken 
interpretation. Economists state that they refrain from casting any judgements, but 
given this knowledge, an effective lack of any criticism (condemnation) of individ-
uals’ behaviour is equivalent to actively supporting all of them. 
However, economics does not limit itself to what is currently the economy. 
Analogous to all other social sciences, it is characterised by a tendency to step into 
the research fields of psychology, sociology, cultural studies and so on. Yet it does 
not admit to being ‘interdisciplinary’ or equal with other disciplines, and it tries to 
impose the rigours of its models onto other dimensions of human existence. A phi-
losopher can propose interesting insights into sociology or culture and an anthro-
pologist can delve into pedagogy to understand his prime domain better. The influ-
ences between disciplines in social sciences are reciprocated, commonly acknowl-
edged and respected. Whereas when economics engages in studying e.g. culture, it 
treats the accomplishments of culture researchers (philosophers, sociologists) with 
ignorance and arrogance, even if they had elaborated many theories and ideas that 
would explain economic aspects of people’s cultural practices (e.g. Bourdieu, 
Baudrilliard or Horkheimer). Economics imposes the economisation on non-eco-
nomic aspects of life while stating that economisation (which usually is synony-
mous with marketing) is only an invisible form, which does not influence their sub-
stance and particularity. In this sense, economics is not a phenomenon, but a pro-
cess, which can be shared by any phenomenon. Using the famous metaphor of 
M. McLuhan, in its approach to other social sciences, economics is a medium, but 
a medium, which becomes the message.17  
Economics is tangled in non-economic, social aspects of human life. The 
claimed morally unbiased attitude does not mean that economics is a truly and com-
pletely ‘positive’ science (meaning that it treats all phenomena as good). In the eco-
nomic realm some phenomena are positive and some have negative connotations. 
The latter group is composed of all things that do not boost economic growth – 
everything that is unproductive. According to Horkheimer, common social ac-
ceptance of ‘activism’ is one of the main features of instrumental reason: ‘All those 
forms of activity which are not productive are stigmatised as senseless or redundant, 
as a luxury. (…) Productive work – both physical as well as mental – brings glory; 
indeed it is the only accepted way of living, and a productive action is any such 
action, any pursuit of any aim that brings profit.’18 The interest of the economics is 
                                                          
16 For a comprehensive overview of opinions of whether economics can be treated as a ‘positive’ science, 
see: J. Dzionek-Kozłowska, Ekonomia jako nauka pozytywna. Refleksje na marginesie “Ekonomii dobra 
i zła” Tomasa Sedlacka, “Annales, Etyka w życiu gospodarczym” 2013, nr 16, pp. 335–344 (the English 
translation of the article was published in Ethics in Economic Thought. Selected Issues and Various 
Perspectives by J. Dzionek-Kozłowska and R. Matera, Lodz University Press & Jagiellonian University 
Press, Lodz-Cracow 2015, pp. 81–89). 
17 M. McLuhan, Zrozumieć media: przedłużenia człowieka, Wydawnictwa Naukowo-Techniczne, War-
saw 2004. 
18 M. Horkheimer, op. cit., p. 67. 
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not limited to those areas of people’s lives, in which they engage in economic turn-
over. Economics is hegemonic and does implicitly cast judgements about how peo-
ple live their whole lives, how they allocate time between ‘economic’ (positively 
valued) and ‘non-economic’ (negatively valued) activities. For example, a well-ed-
ucated mother who decides to dedicate 5 years of her life to raising a child is an 
economically inexplicable loss (although she can redeem her position for the eco-
nomics as a voracious consumer). Particularly, experiencing pleasure that does not 
involve consumption or regenerating forces for upcoming work - are economically 
suspicious.19  
7. Final remarks 
The description of how economics limits itself to using instrumental reason and its 
anti-humanistic orientation might not be alarming were is not for the uncommonly 
pro-active attitude of economics which thrives in elaborating policies and influenc-
ing economic realities. No other social science (e.g. political studies) translates into 
common social practices so easily and widely. The precipitated activism and pres-
sure of obtaining measurable results in economics as a scientific discipline is a re-
flection of the pragmatic paradigm dominating people’s economic practice. Why at 
all should anyone talk about economics through the perspective of philosophy? Is it 
not the nature of economic mechanisms that induces the effective/ineffective oppo-
sition? And does economy not lie ‘beyond good and evil’? Horkheimer proves that, 
after all, every aspect of existence that is typical of mankind – be it science or econ-
omy, or economics – can be philosophically, critically reflected upon. 
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